#define USING(x) if(!(ctx->x)) return 0
#define REPLACING(x)
+// safe to use
static d0_bignum_t *zero, *one, *four;
-static d0_bignum_t *temp0, *temp1, *temp2, *temp3, *temp4; // FIXME make these thread safe by putting them in some per-thread object
+
+static d0_bignum_t *temp0, *temp1, *temp2, *temp3, *temp4;
+static void *tempmutex = NULL; // hold this mutex when using temp0 to temp4
+#define USINGTEMPS() int locked = 0
+#define LOCKTEMPS() do { if(!locked) d0_lockmutex(tempmutex); locked = 1; } while(0)
+#define UNLOCKTEMPS() do { if(locked) d0_unlockmutex(tempmutex); locked = 0; } while(0);
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_INITIALIZE(void)
{
+ USINGTEMPS();
+ tempmutex = d0_createmutex();
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_INITIALIZE());
CHECK_ASSIGN(zero, d0_bignum_int(zero, 0));
CHECK_ASSIGN(one, d0_bignum_int(one, 1));
CHECK_ASSIGN(temp2, d0_bignum_int(temp2, 0));
CHECK_ASSIGN(temp3, d0_bignum_int(temp3, 0));
CHECK_ASSIGN(temp4, d0_bignum_int(temp4, 0));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
void d0_blind_id_SHUTDOWN(void)
{
+ USINGTEMPS();
+ LOCKTEMPS();
d0_bignum_free(zero);
d0_bignum_free(one);
d0_bignum_free(four);
d0_bignum_free(temp3);
d0_bignum_free(temp4);
d0_bignum_SHUTDOWN();
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
+ d0_destroymutex(tempmutex);
+ tempmutex = NULL;
}
// (G-1)/2
-d0_bignum_t *d0_dl_get_order(d0_bignum_t *o, const d0_bignum_t *G)
+static d0_bignum_t *d0_dl_get_order(d0_bignum_t *o, const d0_bignum_t *G)
{
CHECK_ASSIGN(o, d0_bignum_sub(o, G, one));
CHECK(d0_bignum_shl(o, o, -1)); // order o = (G-1)/2
return NULL;
}
-D0_BOOL d0_dl_generate_key(size_t size, d0_bignum_t *G)
+static D0_BOOL d0_dl_generate_key(size_t size, d0_bignum_t *G)
{
// using: temp0
if(size < 16)
return 0;
}
-D0_BOOL d0_rsa_generate_key(size_t size, const d0_bignum_t *challenge, d0_bignum_t *d, d0_bignum_t *n)
+static D0_BOOL d0_rsa_generate_key(size_t size, const d0_bignum_t *challenge, d0_bignum_t *d, d0_bignum_t *n)
{
// uses temp0 to temp4
int fail = 0;
if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp4, one))
break;
if(++gcdfail == 3)
- return 0;
+ goto fail;
++gcdfail;
}
gcdfail = 0;
if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp1, temp0))
{
if(++fail == 3)
- return 0;
+ goto fail;
}
fail = 0;
if(d0_bignum_isprime(temp1, 10) == 0)
if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp4, one))
break;
if(++gcdfail == 3)
- return 0;
+ goto fail;
++gcdfail;
}
return 0;
}
-D0_BOOL d0_rsa_generate_key_fastreject(size_t size, d0_fastreject_function reject, d0_blind_id_t *ctx, void *pass)
+static D0_BOOL d0_rsa_generate_key_fastreject(size_t size, d0_fastreject_function reject, d0_blind_id_t *ctx, void *pass)
{
// uses temp0 to temp4
int fail = 0;
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_generate_private_key_fastreject(d0_blind_id_t *ctx, int k, d0_fastreject_function reject, void *pass)
{
+ USINGTEMPS();
REPLACING(rsa_e); REPLACING(rsa_d); REPLACING(rsa_n);
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->rsa_e, d0_bignum_int(ctx->rsa_e, 65537));
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->rsa_d, d0_bignum_zero(ctx->rsa_d));
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->rsa_n, d0_bignum_zero(ctx->rsa_n));
+ LOCKTEMPS();
if(reject)
CHECK(d0_rsa_generate_key_fastreject(k+1, reject, ctx, pass)); // must fit G for sure
else
CHECK(d0_rsa_generate_key(k+1, ctx->rsa_e, ctx->rsa_d, ctx->rsa_n)); // must fit G for sure
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_modulus(d0_blind_id_t *ctx)
{
+ USINGTEMPS();
USING(rsa_n);
REPLACING(schnorr_G);
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->schnorr_G, d0_bignum_zero(ctx->schnorr_G));
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_dl_generate_key(d0_bignum_size(ctx->rsa_n)-1, ctx->schnorr_G));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_start(d0_blind_id_t *ctx)
{
- // temps: temp0 = order
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 = order
USING(schnorr_G);
REPLACING(schnorr_s); REPLACING(schnorr_g_to_s);
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_dl_get_order(temp0, ctx->schnorr_G));
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->schnorr_s, d0_bignum_rand_range(ctx->schnorr_s, zero, temp0));
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->schnorr_g_to_s, d0_bignum_mod_pow(ctx->schnorr_g_to_s, four, ctx->schnorr_s, ctx->schnorr_G));
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, d0_bignum_zero(ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
static __thread unsigned char shabuf[2048];
size_t sz;
- // temps: temp0 rsa_blind_signature_camouflage^challenge, temp1 (4^s)*rsa_blind_signature_camouflage^challenge
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 rsa_blind_signature_camouflage^challenge, temp1 (4^s)*rsa_blind_signature_camouflage^challenge
USING(rsa_n); USING(rsa_e); USING(schnorr_g_to_s);
REPLACING(rsa_blind_signature_camouflage);
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_pow(temp0, ctx->rsa_blind_signature_camouflage, ctx->rsa_e, ctx->rsa_n));
// we will actually sign HA(4^s) to prevent a malleability attack!
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_mov(temp2, ctx->schnorr_g_to_s));
sz = (d0_bignum_size(ctx->rsa_n) + 7) / 8; // this is too long, so we have to take the value % rsa_n when "decrypting"
if(sz > sizeof(shabuf))
// hash complete
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_mul(temp1, temp2, temp0, ctx->rsa_n));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(out, temp1));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
return 0;
}
d0_iobuf_t *in = NULL;
d0_iobuf_t *out = NULL;
- // temps: temp0 input, temp1 temp0^d
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 input, temp1 temp0^d
USING(rsa_d); USING(rsa_n);
in = d0_iobuf_open_read(inbuf, inbuflen);
out = d0_iobuf_open_write(outbuf, *outbuflen);
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_iobuf_read_bignum(in, temp0));
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_pow(temp1, temp0, ctx->rsa_d, ctx->rsa_n));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(out, temp1));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(in, NULL);
return d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(in, NULL);
d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
return 0;
{
d0_iobuf_t *in = NULL;
- // temps: temp0 input, temp1 rsa_blind_signature_camouflage^-1
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 input, temp1 rsa_blind_signature_camouflage^-1
USING(rsa_blind_signature_camouflage); USING(rsa_n);
REPLACING(schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature);
in = d0_iobuf_open_read(inbuf, inbuflen);
+ LOCKTEMPS();
+
CHECK(d0_iobuf_read_bignum(in, temp0));
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_inv(temp1, ctx->rsa_blind_signature_camouflage, ctx->rsa_n));
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, d0_bignum_mod_mul(ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, temp0, temp1, ctx->rsa_n));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return d0_iobuf_close(in, NULL);
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(in, NULL);
return 0;
}
size_t sz = 0;
D0_BOOL failed = 0;
- // temps: temp0 order, temp0 4^r
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 order, temp0 4^r
if(is_first)
{
USING(schnorr_g_to_s); USING(schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature);
// start schnorr ID scheme
// generate random number r; x = g^r; send hash of x, remember r, forget x
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_dl_get_order(temp0, ctx->schnorr_G));
#ifdef RNG_XKCD
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->r, d0_bignum_int(ctx->r, 4)); // decided by fair dice roll
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, ctx->g_to_t));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_packet(conv, msg, msglen));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, temp0));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, ctx->g_to_t));
d0_iobuf_close(conv, &sz);
conv = NULL;
return d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
return 0;
}
static __thread unsigned char shabuf[2048];
size_t sz;
- // temps: temp0 order, temp0 signature check
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 order, temp0 signature check
if(is_first)
{
REPLACING(schnorr_g_to_s); REPLACING(schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature);
CHECK(d0_bignum_cmp(ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, ctx->rsa_n) < 0);
// check signature of key (t = k^d, so, t^challenge = k)
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_pow(temp0, ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, ctx->rsa_e, ctx->rsa_n));
// we will actually sign SHA(4^s) to prevent a malleability attack!
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(out, ctx->challenge));
// Diffie Hellmann send
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_dl_get_order(temp0, ctx->schnorr_G));
#ifdef RNG_XKCD
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->t, d0_bignum_int(ctx->t, 4)); // decided by fair dice roll
#endif
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_pow(temp0, four, ctx->t, ctx->schnorr_G));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(out, temp0));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
if(status)
*status = !!d0_bignum_cmp(ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, zero);
return d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(in, NULL);
d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
return 0;
d0_iobuf_t *in = NULL;
d0_iobuf_t *out = NULL;
- // temps: 0 order, 1 prod, 2 y, 3 challenge
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: 0 order, 1 prod, 2 y, 3 challenge
REPLACING(other_g_to_t); REPLACING(t);
USING(schnorr_G); USING(schnorr_s); USING(r); USING(g_to_t);
in = d0_iobuf_open_read(inbuf, inbuflen);
out = d0_iobuf_open_write(outbuf, *outbuflen);
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_iobuf_read_bignum(in, temp3));
CHECK(d0_bignum_cmp(temp3, zero) >= 0);
CHECK(d0_bignum_size(temp3) <= SCHNORR_BITS);
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_sub(temp2, ctx->r, temp1, temp0));
#endif
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(out, temp2));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
// Diffie Hellmann recv
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->other_g_to_t, d0_iobuf_read_bignum(in, ctx->other_g_to_t));
return d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(in, NULL);
d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
return 0;
d0_iobuf_t *conv = NULL;
size_t sz;
- // temps: 0 y 1 order
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: 0 y 1 order
USING(challenge); USING(schnorr_G);
REPLACING(other_g_to_t);
in = d0_iobuf_open_read(inbuf, inbuflen);
+ LOCKTEMPS();
+
CHECK(d0_dl_get_order(temp1, ctx->schnorr_G));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_read_bignum(in, temp0));
CHECK(d0_bignum_cmp(temp0, zero) >= 0);
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, ctx->other_g_to_t));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_packet(conv, ctx->msg, ctx->msglen));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, temp3));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, ctx->other_g_to_t));
d0_iobuf_close(conv, &sz);
conv = NULL;
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(in, NULL);
return 0;
}
size_t sz;
static __thread unsigned char shabuf[2048];
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: 2 hash
REPLACING(schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature);
USING(schnorr_g_to_s); USING(rsa_d); USING(rsa_n);
+ LOCKTEMPS();
+
// we will actually sign SHA(4^s) to prevent a malleability attack!
- CHECK(d0_bignum_mov(temp2, ctx->schnorr_g_to_s));
sz = (d0_bignum_size(ctx->rsa_n) + 7) / 8; // this is too long, so we have to take the value % rsa_n when "decrypting"
if(sz > sizeof(shabuf))
sz = sizeof(shabuf);
- CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(temp2, shabuf, sz));
+ CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(ctx->schnorr_g_to_s, shabuf, sz));
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, shabuf, sz));
// + 7 / 8 is too large, so let's mod it
CHECK(d0_bignum_divmod(NULL, temp1, temp2, ctx->rsa_n));
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_pow(ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, temp1, ctx->rsa_d, ctx->rsa_n));
+
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
d0_iobuf_t *conv = NULL;
size_t sz = 0;
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: 0 order 1 4^r 2 hash
if(is_first)
{
USING(schnorr_g_to_s); USING(schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature);
// start schnorr SIGNATURE scheme
// generate random number r; x = g^r; send hash of H(m||r), remember r, forget x
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_dl_get_order(temp0, ctx->schnorr_G));
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->r, d0_bignum_rand_range(ctx->r, zero, temp0));
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_pow(temp1, four, ctx->r, ctx->schnorr_G));
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_sub(temp2, ctx->r, temp1, temp0));
#endif
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(out, temp2));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
// write the message itself
if(with_msg)
return d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
return 0;
}
static __thread unsigned char shabuf[2048];
size_t sz;
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: 0 sig^e 2 g^s 3 g^-s 4 order
if(is_first)
{
REPLACING(schnorr_g_to_s); REPLACING(schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature);
CHECK(d0_bignum_cmp(ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, ctx->rsa_n) < 0);
// check signature of key (t = k^d, so, t^challenge = k)
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_pow(temp0, ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, ctx->rsa_e, ctx->rsa_n));
// we will actually sign SHA(4^s) to prevent a malleability attack!
- CHECK(d0_bignum_mov(temp2, ctx->schnorr_g_to_s));
sz = (d0_bignum_size(ctx->rsa_n) + 7) / 8; // this is too long, so we have to take the value % rsa_n when "decrypting"
if(sz > sizeof(shabuf))
sz = sizeof(shabuf);
- CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(temp2, shabuf, sz));
+ CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(ctx->schnorr_g_to_s, shabuf, sz));
CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, shabuf, sz));
// + 7 / 8 is too large, so let's mod it
// verify signature
CHECK(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp0, temp1));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
if(status)
*status = !!d0_bignum_cmp(ctx->schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature, zero);
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
d0_iobuf_close(in, NULL);
return 0;
}
D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_sessionkey_public_id(const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen)
{
+ D0_BOOL ret;
+
+ USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 result
USING(t); USING(other_g_to_t); USING(schnorr_G);
- // temps: temp0 result
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_pow(temp0, ctx->other_g_to_t, ctx->t, ctx->schnorr_G));
- return d0_longhash_bignum(temp0, (unsigned char *) outbuf, *outbuflen);
+ ret = d0_longhash_bignum(temp0, (unsigned char *) outbuf, *outbuflen);
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
+ return ret;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
projects / xonotic / d0_blind_id.git / commitdiff