+/*
+Copyright (C) 2010-2015 Rudolf Polzer (divVerent)
+Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Ashley Rose Hale (LadyHavoc)
+
+This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+See the GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+
+*/
+
#include "quakedef.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "hmac.h"
#include "libcurl.h"
-cvar_t crypto_developer = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_developer", "0", "print extra info about crypto handshake"};
-cvar_t crypto_servercpupercent = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_servercpupercent", "10", "allowed crypto CPU load in percent for server operation (0 = no limit, faster)"};
-cvar_t crypto_servercpumaxtime = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_servercpumaxtime", "0.01", "maximum allowed crypto CPU time per frame (0 = no limit)"};
-cvar_t crypto_servercpudebug = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_servercpudebug", "0", "print statistics about time usage by crypto"};
+cvar_t crypto_developer = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_developer", "0", "print extra info about crypto handshake"};
+cvar_t crypto_aeslevel = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_aeslevel", "1", "whether to support AES encryption in authenticated connections (0 = no, 1 = supported, 2 = requested, 3 = required)"};
+
+cvar_t crypto_servercpupercent = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_servercpupercent", "10", "allowed crypto CPU load in percent for server operation (0 = no limit, faster)"};
+cvar_t crypto_servercpumaxtime = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_servercpumaxtime", "0.01", "maximum allowed crypto CPU time per frame (0 = no limit)"};
+cvar_t crypto_servercpudebug = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_servercpudebug", "0", "print statistics about time usage by crypto"};
static double crypto_servercpu_accumulator = 0;
static double crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime = 0;
-cvar_t crypto_aeslevel = {CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_aeslevel", "1", "whether to support AES encryption in authenticated connections (0 = no, 1 = supported, 2 = requested, 3 = required)"};
+
+extern cvar_t net_sourceaddresscheck;
+
int crypto_keyfp_recommended_length;
static const char *crypto_idstring = NULL;
static char crypto_idstring_buf[512];
+
#define PROTOCOL_D0_BLIND_ID FOURCC_D0PK
#define PROTOCOL_VLEN (('v' << 0) | ('l' << 8) | ('e' << 16) | ('n' << 24))
// d0_blind_id interface
#define D0_EXPORT
-#ifdef __GNUC__
+#if defined (__GNUC__) || (__clang__) || (__TINYC__)
#define D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__((warn_unused_result))
#else
#define D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
// end of d0_blind_id interface
static dllhandle_t d0_blind_id_dll = NULL;
-static qboolean Crypto_OpenLibrary (void)
+static qbool Crypto_OpenLibrary (void)
{
const char* dllnames [] =
{
return true;
// Load the DLL
- return Sys_LoadLibrary (dllnames, &d0_blind_id_dll, d0_blind_id_funcs);
+ return Sys_LoadDependency (dllnames, &d0_blind_id_dll, d0_blind_id_funcs);
}
static void Crypto_CloseLibrary (void)
{
- Sys_UnloadLibrary (&d0_blind_id_dll);
+ Sys_FreeLibrary (&d0_blind_id_dll);
}
#endif
// end of d0_blind_id interface
static dllhandle_t d0_rijndael_dll = NULL;
-static qboolean Crypto_Rijndael_OpenLibrary (void)
+static qbool Crypto_Rijndael_OpenLibrary (void)
{
const char* dllnames [] =
{
return true;
// Load the DLL
- return Sys_LoadLibrary (dllnames, &d0_rijndael_dll, d0_rijndael_funcs);
+ return Sys_LoadDependency (dllnames, &d0_rijndael_dll, d0_rijndael_funcs);
}
static void Crypto_Rijndael_CloseLibrary (void)
{
- Sys_UnloadLibrary (&d0_rijndael_dll);
+ Sys_FreeLibrary (&d0_rijndael_dll);
}
#endif
qd0_blind_id_util_sha256((char *) out, (const char *) in, n);
}
-static size_t Crypto_LoadFile(const char *path, char *buf, size_t nmax, qboolean inuserdir)
+static size_t Crypto_LoadFile(const char *path, char *buf, size_t nmax, qbool inuserdir)
{
char vabuf[1024];
qfile_t *f = NULL;
return (size_t) n;
}
-static qboolean PutWithNul(char **data, size_t *len, const char *str)
+static qbool PutWithNul(char **data, size_t *len, const char *str)
{
// invariant: data points to insertion point
size_t l = strlen(str);
}
// d0si reading
-static qboolean Crypto_AddPrivateKey(d0_blind_id_t *pk, char *buf, size_t len)
+static qbool Crypto_AddPrivateKey(d0_blind_id_t *pk, char *buf, size_t len)
{
const char *p[1];
size_t l[1];
#define MAX_PUBKEYS 16
static d0_blind_id_t *pubkeys[MAX_PUBKEYS];
static char pubkeys_fp64[MAX_PUBKEYS][FP64_SIZE+1];
-static qboolean pubkeys_havepriv[MAX_PUBKEYS];
-static qboolean pubkeys_havesig[MAX_PUBKEYS];
+static qbool pubkeys_havepriv[MAX_PUBKEYS];
+static qbool pubkeys_havesig[MAX_PUBKEYS];
static char pubkeys_priv_fp64[MAX_PUBKEYS][FP64_SIZE+1];
static char challenge_append[1400];
static size_t challenge_append_length;
int next_step;
char challenge[2048];
char wantserver_idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
- qboolean wantserver_aes;
+ qbool wantserver_aes;
+ qbool wantserver_issigned;
int cdata_id;
}
crypto_data_t;
#define MAKE_CDATA if(!crypto->data) crypto->data = Z_Malloc(sizeof(crypto_data_t))
#define CLEAR_CDATA if(crypto->data) { if(CDATA->id) qd0_blind_id_free(CDATA->id); Z_Free(crypto->data); } crypto->data = NULL
-static crypto_t *Crypto_ServerFindInstance(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, qboolean allow_create)
+static crypto_t *Crypto_ServerFindInstance(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, qbool allow_create)
{
crypto_t *crypto;
int i, best;
if(i < MAX_CRYPTOCONNECTS && (allow_create || cryptoconnects[i].crypto.data))
{
crypto = &cryptoconnects[i].crypto;
- cryptoconnects[i].lasttime = realtime;
+ cryptoconnects[i].lasttime = host.realtime;
return crypto;
}
if(!allow_create)
if(cryptoconnects[i].lasttime < cryptoconnects[best].lasttime)
best = i;
crypto = &cryptoconnects[best].crypto;
- cryptoconnects[best].lasttime = realtime;
+ cryptoconnects[best].lasttime = host.realtime;
memcpy(&cryptoconnects[best].address, peeraddress, sizeof(cryptoconnects[best].address));
CLEAR_CDATA;
return crypto;
}
-qboolean Crypto_FinishInstance(crypto_t *out, crypto_t *crypto)
+qbool Crypto_FinishInstance(crypto_t *out, crypto_t *crypto)
{
// no check needed here (returned pointers are only used in prefilled fields)
if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated)
int keyid;
char idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
int aeslevel;
+ qbool issigned;
}
crypto_storedhostkey_t;
static crypto_storedhostkey_t *crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE];
}
}
-static qboolean Crypto_ClearHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
+static qbool Crypto_ClearHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
{
char buf[128];
int hashindex;
crypto_storedhostkey_t **hkp;
- qboolean found = false;
+ qbool found = false;
LHNETADDRESS_ToString(peeraddress, buf, sizeof(buf), 1);
hashindex = CRC_Block((const unsigned char *) buf, strlen(buf)) % CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE;
return found;
}
-static void Crypto_StoreHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *keystring, qboolean complain)
+static void Crypto_StoreHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *keystring, qbool complain)
{
char buf[128];
int hashindex;
int keyid;
char idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
int aeslevel;
+ qbool issigned;
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return;
++keystring;
keyid = -1;
+ issigned = false;
while(*keystring && keyid < 0)
{
// id@key
const char *idstart, *idend, *keystart, *keyend;
+ qbool thisissigned = true;
++keystring; // skip the space
idstart = keystring;
while(*keystring && *keystring != ' ' && *keystring != '@')
++keystring;
keyend = keystring;
+ if (keystart[0] == '~')
+ {
+ thisissigned = false;
+ ++keystart;
+ }
+
if(idend - idstart == FP64_SIZE && keyend - keystart == FP64_SIZE)
{
- for(keyid = MAX_PUBKEYS - 1; keyid >= 0; --keyid)
- if(pubkeys[keyid])
- if(!memcmp(pubkeys_fp64[keyid], keystart, FP64_SIZE))
+ int thiskeyid;
+ for(thiskeyid = MAX_PUBKEYS - 1; thiskeyid >= 0; --thiskeyid)
+ if(pubkeys[thiskeyid])
+ if(!memcmp(pubkeys_fp64[thiskeyid], keystart, FP64_SIZE))
{
memcpy(idfp, idstart, FP64_SIZE);
idfp[FP64_SIZE] = 0;
+ keyid = thiskeyid;
+ issigned = thisissigned;
break;
}
// If this failed, keyid will be -1.
Con_Printf("Server %s tried to change the host key to a value not in the host cache. Connecting to it will fail. To accept the new host key, do crypto_hostkey_clear %s\n", buf, buf);
if(hk->aeslevel > aeslevel)
Con_Printf("Server %s tried to reduce encryption status, not accepted. Connecting to it will fail. To accept, do crypto_hostkey_clear %s\n", buf, buf);
+ if(hk->issigned > issigned)
+ Con_Printf("Server %s tried to reduce signature status, not accepted. Connecting to it will fail. To accept, do crypto_hostkey_clear %s\n", buf, buf);
}
hk->aeslevel = max(aeslevel, hk->aeslevel);
+ hk->issigned = issigned;
return;
}
memcpy(hk->idfp, idfp, FP64_SIZE+1);
hk->next = crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[hashindex];
hk->aeslevel = aeslevel;
+ hk->issigned = issigned;
crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[hashindex] = hk;
}
-qboolean Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, int *keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, int *aeslevel)
+qbool Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, int *keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, int *aeslevel, qbool *issigned)
{
char buf[128];
int hashindex;
strlcpy(idfp, hk->idfp, idfplen);
if(aeslevel)
*aeslevel = hk->aeslevel;
+ if(issigned)
+ *issigned = hk->issigned;
return true;
}
-int Crypto_RetrieveLocalKey(int keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, qboolean *issigned) // return value: -1 if more to come, +1 if valid, 0 if end of list
+int Crypto_RetrieveLocalKey(int keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, qbool *issigned) // return value: -1 if more to come, +1 if valid, 0 if end of list
{
if(keyid < 0 || keyid >= MAX_PUBKEYS)
return 0;
challenge_append_length = p - challenge_append;
}
-static qboolean Crypto_SavePubKeyTextFile(int i)
+static qbool Crypto_SavePubKeyTextFile(int i)
{
qfile_t *f;
char vabuf[1024];
return true;
}
+static void Crypto_BuildIdString(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ char vabuf[1024];
+
+ crypto_idstring = NULL;
+ dpsnprintf(crypto_idstring_buf, sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf), "%d", d0_rijndael_dll ? crypto_aeslevel.integer : 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
+ if (pubkeys[i])
+ strlcat(crypto_idstring_buf, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), " %s@%s%s", pubkeys_priv_fp64[i], pubkeys_havesig[i] ? "" : "~", pubkeys_fp64[i]), sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf));
+ crypto_idstring = crypto_idstring_buf;
+}
+
void Crypto_LoadKeys(void)
{
char buf[8192];
// PUBLIC KEYS to accept (including modulus)
// PRIVATE KEY of user
- crypto_idstring = NULL;
- dpsnprintf(crypto_idstring_buf, sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf), "%d", d0_rijndael_dll ? crypto_aeslevel.integer : 0);
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
{
memset(pubkeys_fp64[i], 0, sizeof(pubkeys_fp64[i]));
if(qd0_blind_id_verify_private_id(pubkeys[i]) && qd0_blind_id_verify_public_id(pubkeys[i], &status))
{
pubkeys_havepriv[i] = true;
- strlcat(crypto_idstring_buf, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), " %s@%s", pubkeys_priv_fp64[i], pubkeys_fp64[i]), sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf));
+ pubkeys_havesig[i] = status;
// verify the key we just got (just in case)
- if(status)
- pubkeys_havesig[i] = true;
- else
+ if(!status)
Con_Printf("NOTE: this ID has not yet been signed!\n");
Crypto_SavePubKeyTextFile(i);
}
}
}
- crypto_idstring = crypto_idstring_buf;
keygen_i = -1;
+ Crypto_BuildIdString();
Crypto_BuildChallengeAppend();
// find a good prefix length for all the keys we know (yes, algorithm is not perfect yet, may yield too long prefix length)
}
// end
-qboolean Crypto_Available(void)
+qbool Crypto_Available(void)
{
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return false;
return;
}
- if(keygen_i >= MAX_PUBKEYS || !pubkeys[keygen_i])
+ if(keygen_i < 0)
{
- Con_Printf("overflow of keygen_i\n");
- keygen_i = -1;
+ Con_Printf("Unexpected response from keygen server:\n");
+ Com_HexDumpToConsole(buffer, (int)length_received);
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
- if(keygen_i < 0)
+ if(keygen_i >= MAX_PUBKEYS || !pubkeys[keygen_i])
{
- Con_Printf("Unexpected response from keygen server:\n");
- Com_HexDumpToConsole(buffer, (int)length_received);
+ Con_Printf("overflow of keygen_i\n");
+ keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
Con_Printf("Saved to key_%d.d0si%s\n", keygen_i, sessionid.string);
+ Crypto_BuildIdString();
+
keygen_i = -1;
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
}
-static void Crypto_KeyGen_f(void)
+static void Crypto_KeyGen_f(cmd_state_t *cmd)
{
int i;
const char *p[1];
Con_Print("libd0_blind_id DLL not found, this command is inactive.\n");
return;
}
- if(Cmd_Argc() != 3)
+ if(Cmd_Argc(cmd) != 3)
{
- Con_Printf("usage:\n%s id url\n", Cmd_Argv(0));
+ Con_Printf("usage:\n%s id url\n", Cmd_Argv(cmd, 0));
return;
}
SV_LockThreadMutex();
Crypto_LoadKeys();
- i = atoi(Cmd_Argv(1));
+ i = atoi(Cmd_Argv(cmd, 1));
if(!pubkeys[i])
{
Con_Printf("there is no public key %d\n", i);
SV_UnlockThreadMutex();
return;
}
- buf2pos = strlen(Cmd_Argv(2));
- memcpy(buf2, Cmd_Argv(2), buf2pos);
+ buf2pos = strlen(Cmd_Argv(cmd, 2));
+ memcpy(buf2, Cmd_Argv(cmd, 2), buf2pos);
if(!(buf2l = Crypto_UnParsePack(buf2 + buf2pos, sizeof(buf2) - buf2pos - 1, FOURCC_D0IQ, p, l, 1)))
{
Con_Printf("Crypto_UnParsePack failed\n");
// end
// console commands
-static void Crypto_Reload_f(void)
+static void Crypto_Reload_f(cmd_state_t *cmd)
{
Crypto_ClearHostKeys();
Crypto_UnloadKeys();
Crypto_LoadKeys();
}
-static void Crypto_Keys_f(void)
+static void Crypto_Keys_f(cmd_state_t *cmd)
{
int i;
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
}
}
-static void Crypto_HostKeys_f(void)
+static void Crypto_HostKeys_f(cmd_state_t *cmd)
{
int i;
crypto_storedhostkey_t *hk;
}
}
-static void Crypto_HostKey_Clear_f(void)
+static void Crypto_HostKey_Clear_f(cmd_state_t *cmd)
{
lhnetaddress_t addr;
int i;
return;
}
- for(i = 1; i < Cmd_Argc(); ++i)
+ for(i = 1; i < Cmd_Argc(cmd); ++i)
{
- LHNETADDRESS_FromString(&addr, Cmd_Argv(i), 26000);
+ LHNETADDRESS_FromString(&addr, Cmd_Argv(cmd, i), 26000);
if(Crypto_ClearHostKey(&addr))
{
- Con_Printf("cleared host key for %s\n", Cmd_Argv(i));
+ Con_Printf("cleared host key for %s\n", Cmd_Argv(cmd, i));
}
}
}
{
if(d0_blind_id_dll)
{
- Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_reload", Crypto_Reload_f, "reloads cryptographic keys");
- Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_keygen", Crypto_KeyGen_f, "generates and saves a cryptographic key");
- Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_keys", Crypto_Keys_f, "lists the loaded keys");
- Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_hostkeys", Crypto_HostKeys_f, "lists the cached host keys");
- Cmd_AddCommand("crypto_hostkey_clear", Crypto_HostKey_Clear_f, "clears a cached host key");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_reload", Crypto_Reload_f, "reloads cryptographic keys");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_keygen", Crypto_KeyGen_f, "generates and saves a cryptographic key");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_keys", Crypto_Keys_f, "lists the loaded keys");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_hostkeys", Crypto_HostKeys_f, "lists the cached host keys");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_hostkey_clear", Crypto_HostKey_Clear_f, "clears a cached host key");
+
Cvar_RegisterVariable(&crypto_developer);
if(d0_rijndael_dll)
Cvar_RegisterVariable(&crypto_aeslevel);
}
// network protocol
-qboolean Crypto_ServerAppendToChallenge(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, size_t maxlen_out)
+qbool Crypto_ServerAppendToChallenge(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, size_t maxlen_out)
{
// cheap op, all is precomputed
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH; // will be later accepted if encryption was set up
// validate the challenge
for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
- if(challenge[i].time > 0)
- if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strcmp(challenge[i].string, s))
+ if(challenges[i].time > 0)
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenges[i].address) && !strcmp(challenges[i].string, s))
break;
// if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES) // challenge mismatch is silent
- return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
+ return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, "missing challenge in connect");
crypto = Crypto_ServerFindInstance(peeraddress, false);
if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated)
id = (cnt ? atoi(cnt) : -1);
cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
if(!cnt)
- return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
+ return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, "missing cnt in d0pk");
GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(!data_in)
- return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
+ return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, "missing appended data in d0pk");
if(!strcmp(cnt, "0"))
{
int i;
if (!(s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "challenge", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
- return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
+ return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, "missing challenge in d0pk\\0");
// validate the challenge
for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
- if(challenge[i].time > 0)
- if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strcmp(challenge[i].string, s))
+ if(challenges[i].time > 0)
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenges[i].address) && !strcmp(challenges[i].string, s))
break;
// if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
- if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES) // challenge mismatch is silent
- return CRYPTO_DISCARD; // pre-challenge: rather be silent
+ if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES)
+ return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, "invalid challenge in d0pk\\0");
if (!(s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aeslevel", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
aeslevel = 0; // not supported
// I am the server, and my key is ok... so let's set server_keyfp and server_idfp
strlcpy(crypto->server_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_keyfp));
strlcpy(crypto->server_idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_idfp));
+ crypto->server_issigned = pubkeys_havesig[CDATA->s];
if(!CDATA->id)
CDATA->id = qd0_blind_id_new();
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify failed (authentication error)", "Authentication error");
}
- if(status)
- strlcpy(crypto->client_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_keyfp));
- else
- crypto->client_keyfp[0] = 0;
+ strlcpy(crypto->client_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_keyfp));
+ crypto->client_issigned = status;
+
memset(crypto->client_idfp, 0, sizeof(crypto->client_idfp));
fpbuflen = FP64_SIZE;
if(!qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id(CDATA->id, crypto->client_idfp, &fpbuflen))
double t = 0;
static double complain_time = 0;
const char *cnt;
- qboolean do_time = false;
- qboolean do_reject = false;
+ qbool do_time = false;
+ qbool do_reject = false;
char infostringvalue[MAX_INPUTLINE];
if(crypto_servercpupercent.value > 0 || crypto_servercpumaxtime.value > 0)
if(len_in > 5 && !memcmp(data_in, "d0pk\\", 5))
// check if we may perform crypto...
if(crypto_servercpupercent.value > 0)
{
- crypto_servercpu_accumulator += (realtime - crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime) * crypto_servercpupercent.value * 0.01;
+ crypto_servercpu_accumulator += (host.realtime - crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime) * crypto_servercpupercent.value * 0.01;
if(crypto_servercpumaxtime.value)
if(crypto_servercpu_accumulator > crypto_servercpumaxtime.value)
crypto_servercpu_accumulator = crypto_servercpumaxtime.value;
else
{
if(crypto_servercpumaxtime.value > 0)
- if(realtime != crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime)
+ if(host.realtime != crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime)
crypto_servercpu_accumulator = crypto_servercpumaxtime.value;
}
- crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime = realtime;
+ crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime = host.realtime;
if(do_reject && crypto_servercpu_accumulator < 0)
{
- if(realtime > complain_time + 5)
+ if(host.realtime > complain_time + 5)
Con_Printf("crypto: cannot perform requested crypto operations; denial service attack or crypto_servercpupercent/crypto_servercpumaxtime are too low\n");
*len_out = 0;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
static int Crypto_SoftClientError(char *data_out, size_t *len_out, const char *msg)
{
*len_out = 0;
- Con_Printf("%s\n", msg);
+ Con_DPrintf("%s\n", msg);
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
if (len_in == 6 && !memcmp(string, "accept", 6) && cls.connect_trying && d0_rijndael_dll)
{
int wantserverid = -1;
- Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated) // we ALSO get here if we are using an encrypted connection, so let's rule this out
{
if(wantserverid >= 0)
else if (len_in >= 1 && string[0] == 'j' && cls.connect_trying && d0_rijndael_dll)
{
int wantserverid = -1;
- Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
//if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated)
{
if(wantserverid >= 0)
int wantserverid = -1;
// these three are harmless
- if(string[4] == CCREP_SERVER_INFO)
+ if((unsigned char) string[4] == CCREP_SERVER_INFO)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
- if(string[4] == CCREP_PLAYER_INFO)
+ if((unsigned char) string[4] == CCREP_PLAYER_INFO)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
- if(string[4] == CCREP_RULE_INFO)
+ if((unsigned char) string[4] == CCREP_RULE_INFO)
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
- Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
//if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated)
{
if(wantserverid >= 0)
const char *p;
int i;
int clientid = -1, serverid = -1, wantserverid = -1;
- qboolean server_can_auth = true;
+ qbool server_can_auth = true;
char wantserver_idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
int wantserver_aeslevel = 0;
+ qbool wantserver_issigned = false;
+
+ // Must check the source IP here, if we want to prevent other servers' replies from falsely advancing the crypto state, preventing successful connect to the real server.
+ if (net_sourceaddresscheck.integer && LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.connect_address))
+ return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, "challenge message from wrong server");
// if we have a stored host key for the server, assume serverid to already be selected!
// (the loop will refuse to overwrite this one then)
wantserver_idfp[0] = 0;
- Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, wantserver_idfp, sizeof(wantserver_idfp), &wantserver_aeslevel);
+ Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(&cls.connect_address, &wantserverid, NULL, 0, wantserver_idfp, sizeof(wantserver_idfp), &wantserver_aeslevel, &wantserver_issigned);
// requirement: wantserver_idfp is a full ID if wantserverid set
// if we leave, we have to consider the connection
GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(!data_in)
return (wantserverid >= 0) ? Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server tried an unauthenticated connection even though a host key is present") :
- (d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3) ? Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)", NULL) :
+ (d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3) ? Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)") :
CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
// FTEQW extension protocol
if(!vlen_blind_id_ptr)
return (wantserverid >= 0) ? Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server tried an unauthenticated connection even though authentication is required") :
- (d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3) ? Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)", NULL) :
+ (d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3) ? Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)") :
CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
data_in = vlen_blind_id_ptr;
crypto->server_keyfp[0] = 0;
crypto->server_idfp[0] = 0;
memcpy(CDATA->wantserver_idfp, wantserver_idfp, sizeof(crypto->server_idfp));
+ CDATA->wantserver_issigned = wantserver_issigned;
if(CDATA->wantserver_idfp[0]) // if we know a host key, honor its encryption setting
switch(bound(0, d0_rijndael_dll ? crypto_aeslevel.integer : 0, 3))
default: // dummy, never happens, but to make gcc happy...
case 0:
if(wantserver_aeslevel >= 3)
- return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)", NULL);
+ return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)");
CDATA->wantserver_aes = false;
break;
case 1:
break;
case 3:
if(wantserver_aeslevel <= 0)
- return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be supported (crypto_aeslevel >= 1, and d0_rijndael library must be present)", NULL);
+ return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be supported (crypto_aeslevel >= 1, and d0_rijndael library must be present)");
CDATA->wantserver_aes = true;
break;
}
// I am the client, and my key is ok... so let's set client_keyfp and client_idfp
strlcpy(crypto->client_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_keyfp));
strlcpy(crypto->client_idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_idfp));
+ crypto->client_issigned = pubkeys_havesig[CDATA->c];
}
if(serverid >= 0)
CDATA->next_step = 1;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
}
- else if(clientid >= 0)
+ else // if(clientid >= 0) // guaranteed by condition one level outside
{
// skip over server auth, perform client auth only
if(!CDATA->id)
data_out_p += *len_out;
*len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
}
- else
- *len_out = data_out_p - data_out;
-
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
else
if(wantserver_idfp[0]) // if we know a host key, honor its encryption setting
if(wantserver_aeslevel >= 3)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Server insists on encryption, but neither can authenticate to the other");
- return (d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3) ? Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)", NULL) :
+ return (d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3) ? Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "This server requires encryption to be not required (crypto_aeslevel <= 2)") :
CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
}
{
const char *cnt;
int id;
+
+ // Must check the source IP here, if we want to prevent other servers' replies from falsely advancing the crypto state, preventing successful connect to the real server.
+ if (net_sourceaddresscheck.integer && LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.connect_address))
+ return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0pk\\ message from wrong server");
+
cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
id = (cnt ? atoi(cnt) : -1);
cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
{
if(id >= 0)
if(CDATA->cdata_id != id)
- return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
+ return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
if(CDATA->next_step != 1)
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
- cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
+ cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, host.realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
if((s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aes", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
aes = atoi(s);
if(id >= 0)
if(CDATA->cdata_id != id)
- return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
+ return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
if(CDATA->next_step != 3)
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
- cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
+ cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, host.realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify(CDATA->id, data_in, len_in, msgbuf, &msgbuflen, &status))
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify failed (server authentication error)");
}
- if(status)
- strlcpy(crypto->server_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_keyfp));
- else
- crypto->server_keyfp[0] = 0;
+
+ strlcpy(crypto->server_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_keyfp));
+ if (!status && CDATA->wantserver_issigned)
+ {
+ CLEAR_CDATA;
+ return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "Stored host key requires a valid signature, but server did not provide any");
+ }
+ crypto->server_issigned = status;
+
memset(crypto->server_idfp, 0, sizeof(crypto->server_idfp));
fpbuflen = FP64_SIZE;
if(!qd0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id(CDATA->id, crypto->server_idfp, &fpbuflen))
}
// cache the server key
- Crypto_StoreHostKey(&cls.connect_address, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%d %s@%s", crypto->use_aes ? 1 : 0, crypto->server_idfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s]), false);
+ Crypto_StoreHostKey(&cls.connect_address, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "%d %s@%s%s", crypto->use_aes ? 1 : 0, crypto->server_idfp, crypto->server_issigned ? "" : "~", pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s]), false);
if(CDATA->c >= 0)
{
if(id >= 0)
if(CDATA->cdata_id != id)
- return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
+ return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\id\\%d when expecting %d", id, CDATA->cdata_id));
if(CDATA->next_step != 5)
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
- cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
+ cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, host.realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
if(CDATA->s < 0) // only if server didn't auth
{